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Antitrust
ANTITRUST -TREBLE

DAMAGE ACTION-ILLNOS BRICK RULE DOES

NOT BAR SUIT By DIRECT PURCHASER OF PRODUCT WHICH CONTAINS PRICE FIXED COMPONENT PRODUCED By SELLER.

Stotter & Co. v. Amstar Corp. (1978)
In this private antitrust action,' a candy wholesaler sought damages
from twelve sugar refiners for an alleged conspiracy to fix the price of refined sugar in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 Two of the
defendant sugar refiners, Borden and SuCrest, used the sugar to manufacture candy which they sold to plaintiff.3 Alleging that it had been overcharged for the candy containing this sugar, plaintiff claimed that it was thus
4
entitled to treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding
that plaintiff lacked standing since it only purchased products containing
sugar, as opposed to purchasing refined sugar in its unaltered form. 5 Plain1. The action was brought under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Stotter &
Co. v. Amstar Corp., 579 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 197§). Section 4 provides in pertinent part: "Any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor .. . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including reasonable
attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
2. 579 F.2d at 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in
pertinent part: "[E]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal ...." Id. The instant case arose out of the Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation,
wherein the United States Government brought indictments and civil actions against sugar beet
processors and sugar cane refiners, charging price fixing of refined sugar in states west of the
Mississippi. 579 F.2d at 15 n.I. Nunerous private suits, involving both eastern and western
sugar markets, were soon filed. Id. In September, 1975, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation decided that the cases east of the Mississippi should be consolidated before Judge
Cahn in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. See In re Sugar Industry Litigation, 399 F.
Supp. 1397 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
3. 579 F.2d at 15. The plaintiff also purchased products containing sugar from nondefendant manufacturers who had purchased sugar from defendants. Id. On appeal the issue was
limited "to the summary judgment only insofar as it affects the direct purchases of candy from
defendants." Id. at 16.
The court did not reach the question of whether SuCrest or Borden, both of whom refined
sugar and manufactured and sold candy, were the only defendants to whom liability would
attach or whether all twelve sugar refiners were jointly and severally liable to Stotter. Id. at
19-20. (opinion sur petition for panel rehearing).
4. Id. at 15. 1'or the relevant portion of § 4 of the Clayton Act, see note 1 supra.
5. In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D. 322, 338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In
granting summary judgment, the district court relied on Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v.
American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). In Philadelphia
Housing Authority, Judge Lord held that homeowners could not bring an antitrust suit for
treble damages against plumbing fixture manufacturers. 50 F.R.D. at 30. Plaintiffs claimed that
the inflated cost of the plumbing fixtures had been passed on to them in the sale of their
homes. Id. at 19. The court held that plaintiffs' failure to answer interrogatories invoked a
presumption that they had purchased from builders or previous homeowners and not directly
from plumbing fixture manufacturers. Id. The district court did not rely on Illinois Brick Co. v,
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), which had not yet been decided. This distinction between "direct
purchasers" and "indirect purchasers," i.e., those who buy directly from the alleged price fixer
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tiff was therefore "too remote in the chain of distribution of refined sugar to
make a claim of alleged overcharges." 6 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, reasoning that the United States Supreme Court's
proscription of recovery by indirect purchasers in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 7 did not extend to the product itself," reversed, 9 holding that the rule
of Illinois Brick was inapplicable to the situation where the purchased product containing the price fixed component was purchased directly from the
manufacturer of that price fixed component. Stotter & Co. v. Amstar Corp.,
579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978).
The question of which purchaser in the chain of distribution of a price
fixed product has standing to bring an action under section 4 of the Clayton
Act was addressed in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 10 where the Supreme Court barred the use of the "passing-on defense"1 by antitrust defendants.' 2 "Defensive passing-on" refers to the
situation where a defendant asserts that the plaintiff-purchaser was not in
fact injured by price fixing because the plaintiff passed the overcharge on to
his purchaser.' 3 Hanover Shoe barred the use of the passing-on defense,
except in limited circumstances,' 4 due to the difficulties inherent in proving
the amount of injury to each party in the chain of distribution, 1 5 the complexity of multiparty litigation, 16 and the diminished effectiveness of private
and those who buy from a middleman, is of paramount importance in determining whether one
has standing to bring an antitrust action. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text infra.
6. In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D. 322, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
7. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). This Supreme Court decision was handed down after the district
court's decision. See notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Illinois
Brick, see notes 20-23 and accompanying text infra.
8. 579 F.2d at 18.
9. The court also remanded to determine whether SuCrest or Borden actually sold candy
to plaintiffs. 579 F.2d at 20 (opinion sur petition for panel rehearing). The case was heard by
Judges Adams and Weis, and Judge Coolahan of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. Judge Weis wrote the opinion.
10. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). In Hanover Shoe, a lessee of shoe making equipment brought a
private antitrust action against the equipment lessor for refusing to sell equipment. Id. at 48384. The defendant contended that plaintiff had passed the higher costs on to plaintiff's purchasers and therefore was not injured by the higher rental price. Id. at 487-88. The district court
found for plaintiff on the grounds that the passing-on defense was impermissible because plaintiff was the ultimate consumer and suffered a legal injury. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 829 (M.D. Pa. 1960). The court of appeals affirmed in
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 901 (1960). Defendant presented the issue again after losing on the merits. The Third
Circuit affirmed in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 377 F.2d' 776, 781 (3d Cir.
1967). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 389 U.S. 818 (1967).
11. On defensive "passing-on" see text accompanying note 13 infra.
12. 392 U.S. at 494.
13. For a discussion of defensive passing-on, see Pollack, Automatic Treble Damages and the
Passing-on Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183, 1184-91 (1968).
14. 392 U.S. at 488, 494. Circumstances where the passing-on defense may be valid are
where there exists a "pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract," or where "no differential can be proved
between the price unlawfully charged and some price that the seller was required by law to
charge." Id. at 494.
15. Id. at 492-93.
16. Id. at 493-94.
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antitrust enforcement occasioned by the failure of consumers, to whom the

loss is often eventually "passed-on," to bring suit. 1 7 In so doing, the
Hanover Shoe Court insured that a direct purchaser injured by a price fixing
overcharge could bring an action even though he had passed the overcharge

resulting from the price fixing on to his purchaser,'

and did not condition

such an action by an overcharged direct purchaser upon a demonstration of

actual pecuniary loss. 19
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court dealt with another aspect of the
passing-on concept, holding that an indirect purchaser could not bring a tre-

ble damage action against a price fixer for an overcharge. 20 The Court
barred this offensive use of passing-on, whereby an indirect purchaser asserts
injury because an amount of the overcharge created by price fixing was

passed on to him. 21 The Court held that only the overcharged direct purchaser, and no other entity in the chain of distribution, could bring an action
under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 22 The Court was of the opinion that the
antitrust laws would be "more effectively enforced by concentrating the full

recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing
23
every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue."

Id.

17. Id. at 494.
18. Id. The Court stated:
Our conclusion is that Hanover proved injury and the amount of its damages for the
purposes of its treble damage suit when it proved that United had overcharged it during
the damage period and showed the amount of the overcharge; United was not entitled to
assert a passing on defense.

19. See note 18 supra.
20. 431 U.S. at 746. In Illinois Brick, the State of Illinois and 700 local government units in
the Chicago area brought suit against 11 manufacturers and distributors of concrete block in the
same area. Id. at 726. They alleged conspiracy to fix the price of concrete block. Id. at 726-27.
The overcharge passed from defendants' sale to masonry contractors to general contractors and
finally to plaintiffs. Id. at 726. The district court held for defendants because the plaintiffs, as
indirect purchasers, suffered too remote an injury to have standing to sue. Illinois v. Ampress
Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 468 (N.D. Ill. 1975). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed on the
grounds that an indirect purchaser who proves injury from an illegal overcharge is entitled to
bring suit. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976). The Supreme
Court reversed. 431 U.S. at 748.
Between the Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick decisions, a few courts held that an indirect
purchaser could not sue a price fixer. See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co.,
58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); City of Akron v. Laub Baking Co., 1972 Trade Cas. 173,930
(N.D. Ohio 1972); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub. nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). But see In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,
487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). The district court in Stotter
partially relied on Mangano in granting summary judgment against the plaintiff. See note 5
supra.
21. 431 U.S. at 726-27.
22. Id. at 729. For discussion of the Illinois Brick decision, see Note, 23 VILL. L. REV. 381
(1978).
23. 431 U.S. at 735. The Court'opined that the passing-on prohibition should apply to both
offensive and defensive uses, thereby barring indirect purchasers from treble damage actions.
Id. The Court explained that symmetry between offensive and defensive passing-on was necessary to prevent exposing the defendant to conflicting claims and multiple liability, and to prevent the evidentiary complexities underlying Hanover Shoe. Id. at 730-32, 737. The Court
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The Third Circuit, noting that the district court had granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment 2 4 on the basis that the plaintiff was an indirect purchaser and therefore lacked standing to sue, 25 addressed the question of whether "the proscription [of Illinois Brick] against recovery for indirect purchases extends to the product as well as the buyer." 2 6 The court
explained initially that Illinois Brick's prohibition of the use of offensive
passing-on 2 7 barred actions by indirect purchasers. for several reasons, "including the possibility of exposing the defendant to multiple liability and the
evidentiary complexities that would arise in apportioning the overcharge"
28
among the injured parties.
The Third Circuit, however, did not agree with the defendants' contention that since the rationale of Illinois Brick was the "Court's desire to avoid
further complexity" in antitrust litigation, the plaintiff here should be barred
from bringing suit.2 9 As the defendants pointed out, the product in question, candy, did not compete with sugar, the price fixed product. 30 While
the court conceded that "complications in the underlying claims" could arise
because of the lack of competition between the price fixed product and the
product purchased, it nevertheless rejected the defendant's argument that
Illinois Brick's concern with complex litigation should be controlling in this
situation. 3 ' The Third Circuit noted that the Illinois Brick Court was
primarily concerned with the complexities resulting from indirect purchaser
32
suits, and that the instant case was brought by a direct purchaser.
The court also pointed out that a basic premise of Illinois Brick was that
the overcharged direct purchaser is, for section 4 Clayton Act purposes, the
foresaw that plaintiffs at different levels in the chain of distribution would claim to have absorbed the entire overcharge. Id. at 737. The Court also emphasized that private enforcement
of the antitrust laws would be discouraged if litigants were compelled to trace and prove an
overcharge through the distribution chain. Id. at 741. The Court explained that the acceptance
of the passing-on doctrine would mean "massive evidence and complicated theories" in treble
damage actions. Id.
24. 579 F.2d at 16. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
25. 579 F.2d at 16. Although the defendants alleged that the plaintiff's pleadings were deficient, the court stated that plaintiff did plead "not artfully or clearly" that it had purchased the
products containing the price fixed sugar from defendants. Id.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged:
During the period in suit to the present, plaintiff and members of the Class it represents
have purchased various food products containing sugar refined or sold by one or more of
the defendants.
INJURY TO PLAINTIFF AND CLASS
23. As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff and other members of its Class have been
injured in their businesses and other property by having been charged substantially
higher prices for various food products than they would have paid and by having a smaller
volume of business than they would have had in the absence of such violations.
Id. n.3.
26. Id. at 16.

27. For a discussion of defensive and offensive passing-on, see L.

SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF

§ 252 (1977).
28. 579 F.2d at 17. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
29. 579 F.2d at 17.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 17-18.

THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
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injured party. 33 The difficulty in computation here, the Third Circuit observed, would not be in prorating the amount of the injury among multiple
parties, as was the case in Illinois Brick, 34 but merely "isolating the excessive cost of one ingredient which goes into the product purchased by the
plaintiff." 35 Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff had been overcharged, 36
the court then asserted that the plaintiff was the proper party to bring the
37
action since it purchased directly from the alleged price fixer.
Contrarily, the Stotter court agreed with plaintiff's contention that if
Illinois Brick barred plaintiff's cause of action in the instant case, then no
party would have standing to sue an antitrust violator who produced a price
fixed ingredient of a product that it marketed. 38 The court reasoned that a
denial of recovery would "leave a gaping hole in the administration of the
antitrust laws." 39 Illinois Brick, the court explained, was not intended to
create such an escape, 40 because that case had held that a direct purchaser
who had been overcharged was the party injured in his business or property
4
within the meaning of the Clayton Act. 1
Finally, the court rejected SuCrest's argument that since its subsidiary
was plaintiff's vendor and the subsidiary had an independent legal existence,
plaintiff could not proceed directly against SuCrest. 42 The court explained
that there was no reason to distinguish the sale of the candy through SuCrest's subsidiary from sale through Borden's division.4 3 Given "all of the
facts in this case . .. at least for this purpose and in this context," 44 the
subsidiary should be treated as the alter ego of the parent. 4 5 The court
observed that if it recognized the subsidiary's separate legal existence, a
company could evade liability by "inserting a subsidiary between the violator
46
and the first noncontrolled purchaser."
33. Id. at 18. The court noted that any purchaser other than the plaintiff in Stotter would
clearly be an indirect purchaser. Id. at 17.
34. Id. at 18.
35. Id. The court noted that "[t]he difficulty in computation here is not in parceling out
damages among entities in the chain." Id. Here there was but one defendant and the only
calculation a district court would be called upon to make would be the determination of the
difference between the price of the candy without price fixed sugar and the price including the
price fixed sugar. See id.
36. Id. at 18 n.7.
37. Id. at 18. The court stated: "Plaintiff is a direct purchaser and, therefore, entitled to
recover the full extent of the overcharge." Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The court explained that since under Illinois Brick any person other than the purchaser of the final product containing the price fixed component would be an indirect purchaser, any defendant could escape liability by incorporating the price fixed product into
another product. Id.
40. Id. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
41. 579 F.2d at 18. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977).
42. 579 F.2d at 18-19. For a discussion of the violator attempting to circumvent the law by
having its subsidiary alone engage in sales, see Note, supra note 22, at 395.
43. 579 F.2d at 18.
44. Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 18-19. The court noted that "[although the subsidiary does have a separate legal
existence, it is owned by the parent company, and would not ordinarily sue it." Id. at 18.
46. Id. at 19.
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In support of its disregard of the separate legal existence of the subsidiary, the Stotter court referred to footnote 16 of Illinois Brick, 47 in which
the Supreme Court stated that an exception to the prohibition of defensive
passing-on "might be permitted ... where the direct purchaser is owned or
controlled by its customer." 48 The Stotter court stated that the situation
here, where the alleged price fixer owns the direct seller, is the offensive
passing-on "mirror image" of footnote 16's defensive passing-on exception. 49
It is submitted that the court's emphasis on the right of private enforcement provided by the Clayton Act was not misplaced. 50 Congress intended that private parties have a means of redress for injuries suffered due
to antitrust violations. 51 The Third Circuit wisely recognized that if it allowed the defendants in Stotter to escape liability under Illinois Brick, it
would be fostering a situation whereby price fixers could evade liability in
section 4 Clayton Act suits by simply incorporating the price fixed product
52
into another product.
This analysis does not seem to conflict with Illinois Brick. 53 Although
defendants correctly asserted that Illinois Brick's result was at least partially
based upon the Court's concern with complex evidentiary questions, 54 the
problem of prorating the injury among several parties, a crucial concern of
Illinois Brick, 55 does not arise here. 56 More importantly, the plaintiff in
Stotter is a direct purchaser, and, under Illinois Brick, is thus the party
57
"injured" for Clayton Act purposes.
It is further submitted that the court was correct in refusing to give
effect to the separate legal existence of defendant's subsidiary. 58 Such recognition would preclude any treble damage action, since by purchasing the
price fixed component, the subsidiary would become the direct purchaser,
and, as the court properly pointed out, the subsidiary would not sue the
parent. 59

47. Id. at 19. See 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
48. 579 F.2d at 19, quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977).
49. 579 F.2d at 19.
50. See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra. For the text of the Clayton Act, see note
1 supra.
51. "[S]ection 5 gives any person who may be injured in his business by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws, the right to sue for such injury .... 51 CONG. REc. 9073
(1914).
52. See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra.
53. See notes 29-37 and accompanying text supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
55. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
56. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
57. For the text of the relevant portion of § 4 of the Clayton Act, see note 1 and accompanying text supra. See also note 33 supra.
58. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 45 and accompanying text supra. The retailers to whom Stotter sold would
necessarily be indirect purchasers, and the subsidiary manufacturer would not sue. Hence, as a
practical matter Stotter is the only purchaser in a position to seek private enforcement of § 1 of
the Sherman Act.
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Furthermore, the court's interpretation of footnote 16 of the Illinois
Brick decision 60 seems to comport with Illinois Brick's goals of symmetry
between defensive and offensive passing-on and of avoiding the proration of
injury among parties. 6 1 Footnote 16 would allow the price fixer to defend
on the grounds that the plaintiff, a direct purchaser, passed the overcharge
on to an entity that owned or controlled the plaintiff-direct purchaser. 62 The
passing-on defense would be allowed in this situation because the direct
purchaser and its owner or controller are the parties among whom such
damage would be apportioned. 6 3 Likewise in Stotter, where a purchaser
sues a price fixer who controls or owns the direct seller, the difficulties in
64
apportioning damages among the parties are also nonexistent.
It is unclear, however, why the Third Circuit limited this aspect of its
holding to the facts of this case. 65 The court seems to imply that it will
pierce the corporate veil whenever a plaintiff buys from an entity "owned or
controlled" by the price fixer.66 Though as a general rule the corporate veil
is pierced only with reluctance, 6 7 it is submitted that the court could have
indicated clearly the types of situations in which piercing of the corporate
veil would be appropriate.
Stotter arguably stands for the proposition that in a price fixing case, the
party entitled to sue is the first party to purchase the overcharged product
who is not controlled by the price fixer, irrespective of whether or not the
price fixed product is incorporated into another product. 68 Certainly the
Stotter court articulated a concern that there be a party with standing to sue
in each case. 69 Stotter may be more narrowly read as preventing a price
fixer from escaping liability by incorporating a price fixed component into
another product. 70

60. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
61. See note 23 supra.
62. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
63. The Supreme Court stated that the exception is "[a]nother situation in which market
forces have been superseded." 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
64. See notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text supra.
65. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
66. 579 F.2d at 18-19.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (C.C.E.D.
Wis. 1905).
68. 579 F.2d at 18-19.
69. The court insisted that if a price fixer could insulate itself from treble damage actions by
incorporating the price fixed product into another product, there would be a "gaping hole" in
the law through which a price fixer could evade liability. Id. at 18. As to recognition of the
indepeident existence of SuCrest's subsidiary, the court emphasized that the price fixer's subsidiary would not sue its parent, and if the court recognized the subsidiary's independent existence, the price fixer would be insulated from liability. Id. at 18-19. It seems reasonable to
conclude that the court believed that in all cases there should be one party who can and in
actuality will bring an action. See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra. The court stated
that "[t]o adopt defendants' position in the case at bar, however, would permit them to by-pass
the threat of a treble-damage remedy and would be contrary to the spirit of the antitrust laws."
Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
70. See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra.
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The Stotter decision makes it clear that, in the Third Circuit, standing
under section 4 of the Clayton Act depends on the purchaser's location in
the chain of distribution as opposed to the product's location in the chain of
production. 71 Hence, companies in industries in which vertical integration 72 is common, such as the oil, 7 3 steel 74 and paper 75 industries, will not
be able to shield themselves from antitrust liability by incorporating a price
fixed product into another product or by setting up a subsidiary through
which a price fixed product must pass before it reaches an entity that is not
controlled or owned by the price fixer. Since the result in Stotter clearly
effectuates the Clayton Act's goal of enforcement of the antitrust laws
through private damage actions and does not conflict with Illinois Brick's bar
on suits by indirect purchasers, it seems probable that the Stotter court's
analysis and conclusion will be persuasive in other circuits.
Jonathan Willinger
71. See notes 30-37 and accompanying text supra.
72. The Supreme Court has stated that "[e]conomic arrangements between companies standing in a supplier-customer relationship are characterized as 'vertical.' " Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
73. See F. ALLVINE & J. PATTERSON, COMPETITION, LTD.: THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE

(1972).
An important structural feature of the [oil] industry is that all the major firms are vertically integrated. These firms are not only engaged in distributing and marketing gasoline,
but also in finding and producing crude oil from which gasoline is made, in running ...
refineries . . . and finally in operating complex networks of pipelines for controlled distribution .
Id. at 10.
74. The steel industry is another example of a vertically integrated industry. The integrated
steel companies "begin manufacture of steel by mining the raw materials. They operate coal
ovens, blast furnaces and rolling and finishing facilities." United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, 168 F. Supp. 576, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Some of the vertically integrated steel
companies produce and sell finished products such as oil field equipment. Id. at 586. The
application of Stotter to the steel industry could take the form of a price fixing arrangement with
pig iron. Under Stotter, the fact that the steel company incorporates the pig iron into another
product before sale would not insulate the steel company from liability.
75. The paper industry, wherein many paper merchant chains are owned by paper manufacturers and integration from the paper mill to the wholesale paper distributor is not uncommon,
is an example of the piercing of the corporate veil concept in this area. United States v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 446-47 (N.D. Cal. 1967). Thus, if there is price fixing on
the level of paper, the fact that the first purchaser bought the paper from a distributor that is
owned by the price fixer but independently incorporated would not serve to insulate the price
fixer from liability.
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